Cache based remote timing attack on the AES

  • Authors:
  • Onur Acıiçmez;Werner Schindler;Çetin K. Koç

  • Affiliations:
  • School of EECS, Corvallis, Oregon State University, OR;Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Bonn, Germany;School of EECS, Corvallis, Oregon State University, OR

  • Venue:
  • CT-RSA'07 Proceedings of the 7th Cryptographers' track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

We introduce a new robust cache-based timing attack on AES. We present experiments and concrete evidence that our attack can be used to obtain secret keys of remote cryptosystems if the server under attack runs on a multitasking or simultaneous multithreading system with a large enough workload. This is an important difference to recent cache-based timing attacks as these attacks either did not provide any supporting experimental results indicating if they can be applied remotely, or they are not realistically remote attacks.