Side channel cryptanalysis of product ciphers

  • Authors:
  • John Kelsey;Bruce Schneier;David Wagner;Chris Hall

  • Affiliations:
  • (Correspd.) Counterpane Internet Security, 3031 Tisch Way, 100 Plaza East, San Jose, CA 95128, USA E-mail: {kelsey,schneier}@counterpane.com;Counterpane Internet Security, 3031 Tisch Way, 100 Plaza East, San Jose, CA 95128, USA E-mail: {kelsey,schneier}@counterpane.com;U.C. at Berkeley, Soda Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720-1776, USA E-mail: daw@cs.berkeley.edu;Princeton University - Mathematics, Fine Hall, Washington Road, Princeton, NJ 08544-1000, USA E-mail: cjh@math.princeton.edu

  • Venue:
  • Journal of Computer Security
  • Year:
  • 2000

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Abstract

Building on the work of Kocher (1996), Jaffe and Yun (1998), we discuss the notion of side-channel cryptanalysis: cryptanalysis using implementation data. We discuss the notion of side-channel attacks and the vulnerabilities they introduce, demonstrate side-channel attacks against three product ciphers - timing attack against IDEA, processor-flag attack against RC5, and Hamming weight attack against DES - and then generalize our research to other cryptosystems.