Faster and Timing-Attack Resistant AES-GCM

  • Authors:
  • Emilia Käsper;Peter Schwabe

  • Affiliations:
  • ESAT/COSIC, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium B-3001;Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, Eindhoven, Netherlands 5600

  • Venue:
  • CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

We present a bitsliced implementation of AES encryption in counter mode for 64-bit Intel processors. Running at 7.59 cycles/byte on a Core 2, it is up to 25% faster than previous implementations, while simultaneously offering protection against timing attacks. In particular, it is the only cache-timing-attack resistant implementation offering competitive speeds for stream as well as for packet encryption: for 576-byte packets, we improve performance over previous bitsliced implementations by more than a factor of 2. We also report more than 30% improved speeds for lookup-table based Galois/Counter mode authentication, achieving 10.68 cycles/byte for authenticated encryption. Furthermore, we present the first constant-time implementation of AES-GCM that has a reasonable speed of 21.99 cycles/byte, thus offering a full suite of timing-analysis resistant software for authenticated encryption.