The Design of Rijndael
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
AES Power Attack Based on Induced Cache Miss and Countermeasure
ITCC '05 Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and Computing (ITCC'05) - Volume I - Volume 01
Improving Brumley and Boneh timing attack on unprotected SSL implementations
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A refined look at Bernstein's AES side-channel analysis
ASIACCS '06 Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Improving cache attacks by considering cipher structure
International Journal of Information Security
Remote timing attacks are practical
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Side channel cryptanalysis of product ciphers
Journal of Computer Security
Advances on access-driven cache attacks on AES
SAC'06 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Selected areas in cryptography
Cache-collision timing attacks against AES
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Cache attacks and countermeasures: the case of AES
CT-RSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
Opportunities and Limits of Remote Timing Attacks
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Efficient, secure, and isolated execution of cryptographic algorithms on a cryptographic unit
Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Security of information and networks
Cache Timing Attacks on Clefia
INDOCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Cryptology in India: Progress in Cryptology
Analysis of countermeasures against access driven cache attacks on AES
SAC'07 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Selected areas in cryptography
Consecutive S-box lookups: a timing attack on SNOW 3G
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
Improved trace-driven cache-collision attacks against embedded AES implementations
WISA'10 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Information security applications
Cryptanalysis of CLEFIA using differential methods with cache trace patterns
CT-RSA'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Topics in cryptology: CT-RSA 2011
A cache trace attack on CAMELLIA
InfoSecHiComNet'11 Proceedings of the First international conference on Security aspects in information technology
Compiler mitigations for time attacks on modern x86 processors
ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization (TACO) - HIPEAC Papers
An enhanced differential cache attack on CLEFIA for large cache lines
INDOCRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptology in India
COSADE'12 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
Automatic quantification of cache side-channels
CAV'12 Proceedings of the 24th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
Side channel vulnerability metrics: the promise and the pitfalls
Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy
Attacks on implementations of cryptographic algorithms: side-channel and fault attacks
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks
CacheAudit: a tool for the static analysis of cache side channels
SEC'13 Proceedings of the 22nd USENIX conference on Security
Security-Preserving Live Migration of Virtual Machines in the Cloud
Journal of Network and Systems Management
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Cache based side-channel attacks have recently been attracted significant attention due to the new developments in the field. In this paper, we present an efficient trace-driven cache attack on a widely used implementation of the AES cryptosystem. We also evaluate the cost of the proposed attack in detail under the assumption of a noiseless environment. We develop an accurate mathematical model that we use in the cost analysis of our attack. We use two different metrics, specifically, the expected number of necessary traces and the cost of the analysis phase, for the cost evaluation purposes. Each of these metrics represents the cost of a different phase of the attack.