The Design of Rijndael
Lattice Scheduling and Covert Channels
SP '92 Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
AES Power Attack Based on Induced Cache Miss and Countermeasure
ITCC '05 Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and Computing (ITCC'05) - Volume I - Volume 01
A refined look at Bernstein's AES side-channel analysis
ASIACCS '06 Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Advances on access-driven cache attacks on AES
SAC'06 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Selected areas in cryptography
Provably secure masking of AES
SAC'04 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Trace-driven cache attacks on AES (short paper)
ICICS'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Cache attacks and countermeasures: the case of AES
CT-RSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
Cache based remote timing attack on the AES
CT-RSA'07 Proceedings of the 7th Cryptographers' track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
Efficient, secure, and isolated execution of cryptographic algorithms on a cryptographic unit
Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Security of information and networks
Cache Timing Analysis of LFSR-Based Stream Ciphers
Cryptography and Coding '09 Proceedings of the 12th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding
Attacks on implementations of cryptographic algorithms: side-channel and fault attacks
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks
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Cache based attacks (CBA) exploit the different access times of main memory and cache memory to determine information about internal states of cryptographic algorithms. CBAs turn out to be very powerful attacks even in practice. In this paper we present a general and strong model to analyze the security against CBAs. We introduce the notions of information leakage and resistance to analyze the security of several implementations of AES. Furthermore, we analyze how to use random permutations to protect against CBAs. By providing a successful attack on an AES implementation protected by random permutations we show that random permutations used in a straightforward manner are not enough to protect against CBAs. Hence, to improve upon the security provided by random permutations, we describe the property a permutation must have in order to prevent the leakage of some key bits through CBAs.