Finite fields
A New Version of the Stream Cipher SNOW
SAC '02 Revised Papers from the 9th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
AES Power Attack Based on Induced Cache Miss and Countermeasure
ITCC '05 Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and Computing (ITCC'05) - Volume I - Volume 01
A refined look at Bernstein's AES side-channel analysis
ASIACCS '06 Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium on Information, computer and communications security
New cache designs for thwarting software cache-based side channel attacks
Proceedings of the 34th annual international symposium on Computer architecture
A Cache Timing Analysis of HC-256
Selected Areas in Cryptography
Advances on access-driven cache attacks on AES
SAC'06 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Selected areas in cryptography
Analysis of countermeasures against access driven cache attacks on AES
SAC'07 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Selected areas in cryptography
Cache-collision timing attacks against AES
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Cache attacks and countermeasures: the case of AES
CT-RSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
Side-channel analysis of the K2 stream cipher
ACISP'10 Proceedings of the 15th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
Consecutive S-box lookups: a timing attack on SNOW 3G
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
ACNS'11 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
The stream cipher core of the 3GPP encryption standard 128-EEA3: timing attacks and countermeasures
Inscrypt'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
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Cache timing attacks are a class of side-channel attacks that is applicable against certain software implementations. They have generated significant interest when demonstrated against the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), but have more recently also been applied against other cryptographic primitives. In this paper, we give a cache timing cryptanalysis of stream ciphers using word-based linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs), such as Snow, Sober, Turing, or Sosemanuk. Fast implementations of such ciphers use tables that can be the target for a cache timing attack. Assuming that a small number of noise-free cache timing measurements are possible, we describe a general framework showing how the LFSR state for any such cipher can be recovered using very little computational effort. For the ciphers mentioned above, we show how this knowledge can be turned into efficient cache-timing attacks against the full ciphers.