Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
A New Version of the Stream Cipher SNOW
SAC '02 Revised Papers from the 9th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers with Overdefined Systems of Equations
ASIACRYPT '02 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Optical Fault Induction Attacks
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Intel's New AES Instructions for Enhanced Performance and Security
Fast Software Encryption
A Cache Timing Analysis of HC-256
Selected Areas in Cryptography
Cache Timing Analysis of LFSR-Based Stream Ciphers
Cryptography and Coding '09 Proceedings of the 12th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding
Dragon: a fast word based stream cipher
ICISC'04 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Attacks on simplified versions of k2
SIIS'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Security and Intelligent Information Systems
Chosen-IV correlation power analysis on KCipher-2 and a countermeasure
COSADE'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
In this paper we provide the first side-channel analysis of the K2 stream cipher. K2 is a fast and secure stream cipher built upon the strengths of SNOW 2.0. We apply timing attacks, power analysis, and differential fault analysis to K2. We show that naively implemented K2 is vulnerable to cache-timing attacks, and describe how to implement efficient countermeasures to protect K2 against side-channel attacks in hardware and software.