Attacks on simplified versions of k2

Authors:
Deike Priemuth-Schmid
Affiliations:
LACS, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg
Venue:
SIIS'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Security and Intelligent Information Systems
Year:
2011

Citing 2
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The Design of Rijndael

The Design of Rijndael
Side-channel analysis of the K2 stream cipher

ACISP'10 Proceedings of the 15th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy

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Abstract

In 2007, S. Kiyomoto, T. Tanaka and K. Sakurai presented the stream cipher K2 at SECRYPT. In this paper, we present two attacks on simplified versions of K2. We show a differential chosen IV attack with key recovery on a simplified version with 5 initialization clocks with time complexity of 28.1 clocks. For a simplified version with 7 initialization clocks, we show a distinguishing attack with time complexity of 234.8 clocks.