CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Security as a new dimension in embedded system design
Proceedings of the 41st annual Design Automation Conference
Covert and Side Channels Due to Processor Architecture
ACSAC '06 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
New cache designs for thwarting software cache-based side channel attacks
Proceedings of the 34th annual international symposium on Computer architecture
On the power of simple branch prediction analysis
ASIACCS '07 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Cheap Hardware Parallelism Implies Cheap Security
FDTC '07 Proceedings of the Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
Yet another MicroArchitectural Attack:: exploiting I-Cache
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Computer security architecture
An information-theoretic model for adaptive side-channel attacks
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A novel cache architecture with enhanced performance and security
Proceedings of the 41st annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture
Trace-driven cache attacks on AES (short paper)
ICICS'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Cache-collision timing attacks against AES
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Cache attacks and countermeasures: the case of AES
CT-RSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
Side-channel vulnerability factor: a metric for measuring information leakage
Proceedings of the 39th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Side-channels enable attackers to break a cipher by exploiting observable information from the cipher program's execution to infer its secret key. While some defenses have been proposed to protect information leakage due to certain side channels, the effectiveness of these defenses have mostly been given only qualitative analysis by their authors. It is desirable to have a general quantitative method and metric to evaluate a system's vulnerability to side-channel attacks. In this paper, we define the features of a good side-channel leakage metric. We review a recently proposed metric called the Side-channel Vulnerability Factor (SVF) and discuss its merits and issues. We suggest the CSV metric, which tries to show how to overcome some of the shortcomings of the SVF metric, without completely changing its character. We use software cache side-channel attacks and defenses as an example to compare the metrics with known and measurable results on system leakiness.