Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
AES Power Attack Based on Induced Cache Miss and Countermeasure
ITCC '05 Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and Computing (ITCC'05) - Volume I - Volume 01
Side channel cryptanalysis of product ciphers
Journal of Computer Security
Robust First Two Rounds Access Driven Cache Timing Attack on AES
CSSE '08 Proceedings of the 2008 International Conference on Computer Science and Software Engineering - Volume 03
Efficient Cache Attacks on AES, and Countermeasures
Journal of Cryptology
Advances on access-driven cache attacks on AES
SAC'06 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Selected areas in cryptography
Cache Games -- Bringing Access-Based Cache Attacks on AES to Practice
SP '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Cache-collision timing attacks against AES
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Differential cache-collision timing attacks on AES with applications to embedded CPUs
CT-RSA'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
An enhanced differential cache attack on CLEFIA for large cache lines
INDOCRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptology in India
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Cache attacks are a special form of implementation attacks and focus on the exploitation of weaknesses in the implementation of a specific algorithm. We demonstrate an access-driven cache attack, which is based on the analysis of memory-access patterns due to the T-table accesses of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Based on the work of Tromer etal. [20] we gather the cache-memory access patterns of AES T-table implementations and perform a pattern-matching attack in order to recover the used secret key. These T-tables usually do not start at memory addresses which are mapped to the beginning of a specific cache line. Thus, focusing on disaligned AES T-tables allows us to recover the whole secret key by considering only the first round of the AES. We apply the presented cache attack on a Google Nexus S smartphone, which employs a Cortex-A8 processor and runs a fully-functioning operating system. The attack is purely implemented in software and the only requirement is a rooted mobile device. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to launch an access-driven attack on an ARM Cortex-A processor. Based on our observations of the gathered access patterns we also present an enhancement, which in some cases allows us to recover the secret key without a subsequent brute-force key search.