Hey, you, get off of my cloud: exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Countermeasures against fault attacks on software implemented AES: effectiveness and cost
WESS '10 Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Embedded Systems Security
A predictive model for cache-based side channels in multicore and multithreaded microprocessors
MMM-ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Mathematical methods, models and architectures for computer network security
Cryptanalysis of CLEFIA using differential methods with cache trace patterns
CT-RSA'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Topics in cryptology: CT-RSA 2011
ACNS'11 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Really fast syndrome-based hashing
AFRICACRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Progress in cryptology in Africa
Efficient hashing using the AES instruction set
CHES'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Eliminating fine grained timers in Xen
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Cloud computing security workshop
A cache trace attack on CAMELLIA
InfoSecHiComNet'11 Proceedings of the First international conference on Security aspects in information technology
Non-monopolizable caches: Low-complexity mitigation of cache side channel attacks
ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization (TACO) - HIPEAC Papers
An enhanced differential cache attack on CLEFIA for large cache lines
INDOCRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptology in India
Multi-location leakage resilient cryptography
PKC'12 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography
STEALTHMEM: system-level protection against cache-based side channel attacks in the cloud
Security'12 Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium
Are AES x86 cache timing attacks still feasible?
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Workshop on Cloud computing security workshop
Cross-VM side channels and their use to extract private keys
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The security impact of a new cryptographic library
LATINCRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Unraveling timewarp: what all the fuzz is about?
Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy
Implementing side-channel attacks on suggest boxes in web applications
Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security of Internet of Things
Düppel: retrofitting commodity operating systems to mitigate cache side channels in the cloud
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
Cloudoscopy: services discovery and topology mapping
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM workshop on Cloud computing security workshop
Attacks on implementations of cryptographic algorithms: side-channel and fault attacks
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks
Cache-Access pattern attack on disaligned AES t-tables
COSADE'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
Remote cache-timing attacks against AES
Proceedings of the First Workshop on Cryptography and Security in Computing Systems
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We describe several software side-channel attacks based on inter-process leakage through the state of the CPU’s memory cache. This leakage reveals memory access patterns, which can be used for cryptanalysis of cryptographic primitives that employ data-dependent table lookups. The attacks allow an unprivileged process to attack other processes running in parallel on the same processor, despite partitioning methods such as memory protection, sandboxing, and virtualization. Some of our methods require only the ability to trigger services that perform encryption or MAC using the unknown key, such as encrypted disk partitions or secure network links. Moreover, we demonstrate an extremely strong type of attack, which requires knowledge of neither the specific plaintexts nor ciphertexts and works by merely monitoring the effect of the cryptographic process on the cache. We discuss in detail several attacks on AES and experimentally demonstrate their applicability to real systems, such as OpenSSL and Linux’s dm-crypt encrypted partitions (in the latter case, the full key was recovered after just 800 writes to the partition, taking 65 milliseconds). Finally, we discuss a variety of countermeasures which can be used to mitigate such attacks.