Non-monopolizable caches: Low-complexity mitigation of cache side channel attacks
ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization (TACO) - HIPEAC Papers
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Proceedings of the 33rd ACM SIGPLAN conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation
Side-channel vulnerability factor: a metric for measuring information leakage
Proceedings of the 39th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture
Proceedings of the 39th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture
COSADE'12 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
Automatic quantification of cache side-channels
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Simple photonic emission analysis of AES: photonic side channel analysis for the rest of us
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Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy
Düppel: retrofitting commodity operating systems to mitigate cache side channels in the cloud
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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Proceedings of the 2013 ACM workshop on Cloud computing security workshop
SideAuto: quantitative information flow for side-channel leakage in web applications
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
Cache-Access pattern attack on disaligned AES t-tables
COSADE'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
CacheAudit: a tool for the static analysis of cache side channels
SEC'13 Proceedings of the 22nd USENIX conference on Security
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Side channel attacks on cryptographic systems exploit information gained from physical implementations rather than theoretical weaknesses of a scheme. In recent years, major achievements were made for the class of so called access-driven cache attacks. Such attacks exploit the leakage of the memory locations accessed by a victim process. In this paper we consider the AES block cipher and present an attack which is capable of recovering the full secret key in almost real time for AES-128, requiring only a very limited number of observed encryptions. Unlike previous attacks, we do not require any information about the plaintext (such as its distribution, etc.). Moreover, for the first time, we also show how the plaintext can be recovered without having access to the cipher text at all. It is the first working attack on AES implementations using compressed tables. There, no efficient techniques to identify the beginning of AES rounds is known, which is the fundamental assumption underlying previous attacks. We have a fully working implementation of our attack which is able to recover AES keys after observing as little as 100 encryptions. It works against the OpenS SL 0.9.8n implementation of AES on Linux systems. Our spy process does not require any special privileges beyond those of a standard Linux user. A contribution of probably independent interest is a denial of service attack on the task scheduler of current Linux systems (CFS), which allows one to observe (on average) every single memory access of a victim process.