The EM Side-Channel(s)

  • Authors:
  • Dakshi Agrawal;Bruce Archambeault;Josyula R. Rao;Pankaj Rohatgi

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-;-;-

  • Venue:
  • CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

We present results of a systematic investigation of leakage of compromising information via electromagnetic (EM) emanations from CMOS devices. These emanations are shown to consist of a multiplicity of signals, each leaking somewhat different information about the underlying computation. We show that not only can EM emanations be used to attack cryptographic devices where the power side-channel is unavailable, they can even be used to break power analysis countermeasures.