The Design of Rijndael
Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA): Measures and Counter-Measures for Smart Cards
E-SMART '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on Research in Smart Cards: Smart Card Programming and Security
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Using Second-Order Power Analysis to Attack DPA Resistant Software
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Electromagnetic Analysis: Concrete Results
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Information Security and Cryptology --- ICISC 2008
Using Optical Emission Analysis for Estimating Contribution to Power Analysis
FDTC '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
When failure analysis meets side-channel attacks
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Mutual Information Analysis: a Comprehensive Study
Journal of Cryptology - Special Issue on Hardware and Security
Localized electromagnetic analysis of cryptographic implementations
CT-RSA'12 Proceedings of the 12th conference on Topics in Cryptology
Simple photonic emission analysis of AES: photonic side channel analysis for the rest of us
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
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This work presents the first differential side channel analysis to exploit photonic emissions. We call this form of analysis Differential Photonic Emission Analysis (DPEA). After identifying a suitable area for the analysis, our system captures photonic emissions from switching transistors and relates them to the program running in the chip. The subsequent differential analysis reveals the secret key. We recovered leakage from the datapath's driving inverters of a proof of concept AES-128 implementation. We successfully performed DPEA and were able to recover the full AES secret key from the photonic emissions. The system costs for an attack are comparable to power analysis techniques and the presented approach allows for AES key recovery in a relevant amount of time. Thus, this work extends the research on the photonic side channel and emphasizes that the photonic side channel poses a serious threat to modern secure ICs.