Using Second-Order Power Analysis to Attack DPA Resistant Software

  • Authors:
  • Thomas S. Messerges

  • Affiliations:
  • -

  • Venue:
  • CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
  • Year:
  • 2000

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Abstract

Under a simple power leakage model based on Hamming weight, a software implementation of a data-whitening routine is shown to be vulnerable to a first-order Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack. This routine is modified to resist the first-order DPA attack, but is subsequently shown to be vulnerable to a second-order DPA attack. A second-order DPA attack that is optimal under certain assumptions is also proposed. Experimental results in an ST16 smartcard confirm the practicality of the first and second-order DPA attacks.