Threshold implementations against side-channel attacks and glitches

  • Authors:
  • Svetla Nikova;Christian Rechberger;Vincent Rijmen

  • Affiliations:
  • Department Electrical Engineering, ESAT/COSIC, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium;Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK), Graz University of Technology, Austria;Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK), Graz University of Technology, Austria

  • Venue:
  • ICICS'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information and Communications Security
  • Year:
  • 2006

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Implementations of cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to side-channel attacks. Masking techniques are employed to counter side-channel attacks that are based on multiple measurements of the same operation on different data. Most currently known techniques require new random values after every nonlinear operation and they are not effective in the presence of glitches. We present a new method to protect implementations. Our method has a higher computational complexity, but requires random values only at the start, and stays effective in the presence of glitches.