Side-channel leakage of masked CMOS gates

  • Authors:
  • Stefan Mangard;Thomas Popp;Berndt M. Gammel

  • Affiliations:
  • Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK), Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria;Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK), Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria;Infineon Technolgies AG, Munich, Germany

  • Venue:
  • CT-RSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

There are many articles and patents on the masking of logic gates. However, the existing publications assume that a masked logic gate switches its output no more than once per clock cycle. Unfortunately, this assumption usually does not hold true in practice. In this article, we show that glitches occurring in circuits of masked gates make these circuits susceptible to classical first-order DPA attacks. Besides a thorough theoretical analysis of the DPA-resistance of masked gates in the presence of glitches, we also provide simulation results that confirm the theoretical elaborations. Glitches occur in every CMOS circuit. Consequently, the currently known masking schemes for CMOS gates do not prevent DPA attacks.