Statistical Digital Signal Processing and Modeling
Statistical Digital Signal Processing and Modeling
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Side-channel leakage of masked CMOS gates
CT-RSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
WISA'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information Security Applications
SCARE of an Unknown Hardware Feistel Implementation
CARDIS '08 Proceedings of the 8th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
Improving first order differential power attacks through digital signal processing
Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Security of information and networks
Enhancing correlation electromagnetic attack using planar near-field cartography
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
Formal framework for the evaluation of waveform resynchronization algorithms
WISTP'11 Proceedings of the 5th IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practice: security and privacy of mobile devices in wireless communication
Power Analysis Attack Resistance Engineering by Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS)
Side channel analysis attacks using AM demodulation on commercial smart cards with SEED
Journal of Systems and Software
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In the field of the Side Channel Analysis, hardware distortions such as glitches and random frequency are classical countermeasures. A glitch influences the side channel amplitude while a random frequency damages the signal both in time and in amplitude. For minimizing these countermeasures effects, some trace treatments based on peak extraction or auto-correlation methods exist. However, none of them takes into account the amplitude mistake. In this paper, we show that this amplitude mistake is created by glitches but also by a random frequency. We propose then a reshaping processing that erases these effects on side channel traces both on the time and amplitude axis. The solution reconstructed a side channel signal, avoiding the hardware countermeasures and the clock relativity consequences which can be meaningful for Side Channel Attacks. Its efficiency is demonstrated on a Differential Power Attack performed on a DES implementation and on a Template Attack performed on a RSA implementation.