Differential Power Analysis in the Presence of Hardware Countermeasures
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Power Attacks on Secure Hardware Based on Early Propagation of Data
IOLTS '06 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE International Symposium on On-Line Testing
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Defeating classical hardware countermeasures: a new processing for side channel analysis
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A High-Resolution Phase-Based Waveform Matching and Its Application to Side-Channel Attacks
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
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EUROCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Higher-Order Masking and Shuffling for Software Implementations of Block Ciphers
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
EM Side-Channel Attacks on Commercial Contactless Smartcards Using Low-Cost Equipment
Information Security Applications
Efficient use of random delays in embedded software
WISTP'07 Proceedings of the 1st IFIP TC6 /WG8.8 /WG11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practices: smart cards, mobile and ubiquitous computing systems
A new correlation frequency analysis of the side channel
WESS '10 Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Embedded Systems Security
Analysis and improvement of the random delay countermeasure of CHES 2009
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
A proposition for correlation power analysis enhancement
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
High-resolution side-channel attack using phase-based waveform matching
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Security evaluation of DPA countermeasures using dual-rail pre-charge logic style
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
EM analysis of rijndael and ECC on a wireless java-based PDA
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Efficient removal of random delays from embedded software implementations using hidden markov models
CARDIS'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
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In side-channel analysis, the waveforms can be acquired misaligned. Several algorithms have been put forward to resynchronize signals, as a pretreatment before the attack proper. In this article, we examine two of them, namely amplitude-only and phase-only correlation (abridged AOC and POC), and introduce a third one, called threshold-POC (T-POC) that corrects a flaw of the phase-only correlation. Those three resynchronization algorithms are computationally efficient insofar as they find the correct displacement in O(n log n) steps per waveform made up of n samples. Former studies on resynchronization algorithms quantified their quality by their indirect effect on side-channel attacks. We introduce in this article a formal framework for the evaluation of the resynchronization algorithms per se. A benchmarking on representative waveforms shows that there is an adequation between the waveforms and the most suitable resynchronization algorithm. On unprotected circuits, the intrawaveform similarity in amplitude or in phase determines the choice for either the AOC or the POC algorithm. Circuits protected by hiding countermeasures have their amplitude made as constant as possible. Therefore, the intra-waveform similarity in amplitude is lowered and the POC is better. Circuits protected by masking countermeasures have their amplitude made as random as possible. Therefore, even if the intrawaveform similarity in amplitude is high, the inter-waveform similarity is reduced; hence a trade-off between AOC and POC, namely T-POC, is the most adequate resynchronization algorithm.