A Combined Timing and Power Attack
PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography
DES and Differential Power Analysis (The "Duplication" Method)
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
IPA: A New Class of Power Attacks
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Simplified Adaptive Multiplicative Masking for AES
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Power-Analysis Attack on an ASIC AES implementation
ITCC '04 Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and Computing (ITCC'04) Volume 2 - Volume 2
ACISP'03 Proceedings of the 8th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
Provably secure masking of AES
SAC'04 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
A side-channel analysis resistant description of the AES s-box
FSE'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
Pinpointing the side-channel leakage of masked AES hardware implementations
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Side-channel leakage of masked CMOS gates
CT-RSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
Small size, low power, side channel-immune AES coprocessor: design and synthesis results
AES'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Advanced Encryption Standard
Successfully attacking masked AES hardware implementations
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
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Gate level masking is one of the most popular countermeasures against Differential Power Attack (DPA). The present paper proposes a masking technique for AND gates, which are then used to build a balanced and masked multiplier in GF(2n). The circuits are shown to be computationally secure and have no glitches which are dependent on unmasked data. Finally, the masked multiplier in GF(24) is used to implement a masked AES S-Box in GF(24)2. Power measurements are taken to support the claim of random power consumption.