CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Logic Level Design Methodology for a Secure DPA Resistant ASIC or FPGA Implementation
Proceedings of the conference on Design, automation and test in Europe - Volume 1
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Random Switching Logic: A New Countermeasure against DPA and Second-Order DPA at the Logic Level
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Evaluation of the Masked Logic Style MDPL on a Prototype Chip
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Masking and Dual-Rail Logic Don't Add Up
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
DPA-Resistance Without Routing Constraints?
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Practical Attacks on Masked Hardware
CT-RSA '09 Proceedings of the The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2009 on Topics in Cryptology
Changing the odds against masked logic
SAC'06 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Selected areas in cryptography
Power analysis attacks on MDPL and DRSL implementations
ICISC'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Dual-rail random switching logic: a countermeasure to reduce side channel leakage
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Security evaluation of DPA countermeasures using dual-rail pre-charge logic style
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Side-channel leakage of masked CMOS gates
CT-RSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
Successfully attacking masked AES hardware implementations
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Masked dual-rail pre-charge logic: DPA-resistance without routing constraints
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
DPA leakage models for CMOS logic circuits
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
The “backend duplication” method
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Masked dual-rail precharge logic encounters state-of-the-art power analysis methods
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Several dual-rail logic styles make use of single-rail flip-flops for storing intermediate states. We show that single mask bits, as applied by various side-channel resistant logic styles such as MDPL and iMDPL, are not sufficient to obfuscate the remaining leakage of single-rail flip-flops. By applying simple models for the leakage of masked flip-flops, we design a new attack on circuits implemented using masked single-rail flip-flops. Contrary to previous attacks on masked logic styles, our attack does not predict the mask bit and does not need detailed knowledge about the attacked device, e.g., the circuit layout. Moreover, our attack works even if all the load capacitances of the complementary signals are perfectly balanced and even if the PRNG is ideally unbiased. Finally, after performing the attack on DRSL, MDPL, and iMDPL circuits we show that single-bit masks do not influence the exploitability of the revealed leakage of the masked flip-flops.