DPA-Resistance Without Routing Constraints?

  • Authors:
  • Benedikt Gierlichs

  • Affiliations:
  • K.U. Leuven, ESAT/SCD-COSIC, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, B-3001 Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium

  • Venue:
  • CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

MDPL is a logic style claiming to provide resistance against Differential Side Channel Analysis on power consumption measurements. In this paper we show that the power consumption of a non-linear MDPL gate can be reliably exploited to determine signal values and hence secret data, if the random masks have a slight bias. We present an attack methodology and a case study on how to infer secret key bits of an MDPL secured AES-ASIC in practice by attacking a single MDPL AND gate in a VLSI circuit. Our attack is not based on frequently made assumptions on circuit "anomalies", but on the per definition unbalanced routing, realistic PRNG biases, and knowledge of the circuit layout.