Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Logic Level Design Methodology for a Secure DPA Resistant ASIC or FPGA Implementation
Proceedings of the conference on Design, automation and test in Europe - Volume 1
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
DPA-Resistance Without Routing Constraints?
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Provably secure masking of AES
SAC'04 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
A side-channel analysis resistant description of the AES s-box
FSE'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
Pinpointing the side-channel leakage of masked AES hardware implementations
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Security implications of crosstalk in switching CMOS gates
ISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security
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Hardware masking is a well-known countermeasure against Side-Channel Attacks (SCA). Like many other countermeasures, the side-channel resistance of masked circuits is susceptible to low-level circuit effects. However, no detailed analysis is available that explains how , and to what extent , these low-level circuit effects are causing side-channel leakage. Our first contribution is a unified and consistent analysis to explain how glitches and inter-wire capacitance cause side-channel leakage on masked hardware. Our second contribution is to show that inter-wire capacitance and glitches are causing side-channel leakage of comparable magnitude according to HSPICE simulations. Our third contribution is to confirm our analysis with a successful DPA-attack on a 90nm COMS FPGA implementation of a glitch-free masked AES S-Box. According to existing literature, this circuit would be side-channel resistant, while according to our analysis and measurement, it shows side-channel leakage. Our conclusion is that circuit-level effects, not only glitches, present a practical concern for masking schemes.