An Optimized S-Box Circuit Architecture for Low Power AES Design
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A Logic Level Design Methodology for a Secure DPA Resistant ASIC or FPGA Implementation
Proceedings of the conference on Design, automation and test in Europe - Volume 1
Side-channel leakage of masked CMOS gates
CT-RSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
Successfully attacking masked AES hardware implementations
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Masked dual-rail pre-charge logic: DPA-resistance without routing constraints
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
DPA leakage models for CMOS logic circuits
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
The “backend duplication” method
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Countering early evaluation: an approach towards robust dual-rail precharge logic
WESS '10 Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Embedded Systems Security
COSADE'12 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
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In recent years, certain countermeasures against differential power analysis (DPA) at the logic level have been proposed. Recently, Popp and Mangard proposed a new countermeasure-masked dual-rail pre-charge logic (MDPL); this countermeasure combines dual-rail circuits with random masking to improve the wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL). They claimed that it could implement secure circuits using a standard CMOS cell library without special constraints for the place-and-route method because the difference between the loading capacitances of all the pairs of complementary logic gates in MDPL can be compensated for by the random masking. In this paper, we particularly focus on the signal transition of MDPL gates and evaluate the DPA-resistance of MDPL in detail. Our evaluation results reveal that when the input signals have different delay times, leakage occurs in the MDPL as well as WDDL gates, even if MDPL is effective in reducing the leakage caused by the difference in loading capacitances. Furthermore, in order to validate our evaluation, we demonstrate a problem with different input signal delays by conducting measurements for an FPGA.