IBM Systems Journal - Special issue on cryptology
Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Masking and Dual-Rail Logic Don't Add Up
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
PRESENT: An Ultra-Lightweight Block Cipher
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
SCARE of an Unknown Hardware Feistel Implementation
CARDIS '08 Proceedings of the 8th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
Statistical Analysis of Second Order Differential Power Analysis
IEEE Transactions on Computers
A generic method for secure Sbox implementation
WISA'07 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information security applications
Correlation-enhanced power analysis collision attack
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Provably secure higher-order masking of AES
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Improved collision-correlation power analysis on first order protected AES
CHES'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
CHES'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Provably secure masking of AES
SAC'04 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Threshold implementations against side-channel attacks and glitches
ICICS'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information and Communications Security
HIGHT: a new block cipher suitable for low-resource device
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Masked dual-rail pre-charge logic: DPA-resistance without routing constraints
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Statistical tools flavor side-channel collision attacks
EUROCRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 31st Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Compact implementation and performance evaluation of block ciphers in ATtiny devices
AFRICACRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Cryptology in Africa
How far should theory be from practice?: evaluation of a countermeasure
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
RSM: a small and fast countermeasure for AES, secure against 1st and 2nd-order zero-offset SCAs
DATE '12 Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
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The trend in the protection against side-channel analysis is to be more secure with little consideration for the cost. However in small devices like RFID, traditional security solutions might be impractical due to limited availability of resources. Thus designers are often forced to use imperfect but low-cost security solutions. When implementing masking countermeasures on a low-resource device, designers are not only limited in memory or power but also lacks a high-throughput source of randomness. In this paper, we stick to a formal security notion (1st-degree security), but seek a low-cost countermeasure against side-channel attacks. The proposed countermeasure is based on masking but needs only one bit of random to resist first-degree attacks like correlation power analysis. Furthermore the implementation also resists side-channel collision attacks once the entropy of random is increased to 16 bits. We show that security can be obtained at extremely low overhead and with as few as a couple of random bytes. This is supported by an application on PRESENT which is provably masked at first-degree for performance overhead of only 1%. Side-channel laboratory evaluations are also provided to support our claim.