CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Securing the AES Finalists Against Power Analysis Attacks
FSE '00 Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Using Second-Order Power Analysis to Attack DPA Resistant Software
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
An Implementation of DES and AES, Secure against Some Attacks
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Multiplicative Masking and Power Analysis of AES
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Multiple-Differential Side-Channel Collision Attacks on AES
CHES '08 Proceeding sof the 10th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '08 Proceeding sof the 10th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks
EUROCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
An improved SCARE cryptanalysis against a secret A3/A8 GSM algorithm
ICISS'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Information systems security
Improved side-channel collision attacks on AES
SAC'07 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Selected areas in cryptography
A very compact "Perfectly masked" S-box for AES
ACNS'08 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Correlation-enhanced power analysis collision attack
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Provably secure higher-order masking of AES
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Defeating RSA multiply-always and message blinding countermeasures
CT-RSA'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Topics in cryptology: CT-RSA 2011
A side-channel analysis resistant description of the AES s-box
FSE'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
Successfully attacking masked AES hardware implementations
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Statistical tools flavor side-channel collision attacks
EUROCRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 31st Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Same values power analysis using special points on elliptic curves
COSADE'12 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
Unified and optimized linear collision attacks and their application in a non-profiled setting
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A low-entropy first-degree secure provable masking scheme for resource-constrained devices
Proceedings of the Workshop on Embedded Systems Security
COSADE'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
First-order collision attack on protected NTRU cryptosystem
Microprocessors & Microsystems
Proceedings of the First Workshop on Cryptography and Security in Computing Systems
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The recent results presented by Moradi et al. on AES at CHES 2010 and Witteman et al. on square-and-multiply always RSA exponentiation at CT-RSA 2011 have shown that collision-correlation power analysis is able to recover the secret keys on embedded implementations. However, we noticed that the attack published last year by Moradi et al. is not efficient on correctly first-order protected implementations. We propose in this paper improvements on collision-correlation attacks which require less power traces than classical second-order power analysis techniques.We present here two new methods and show in practice their real efficiency on two first-order protected AES implementations. We also mention that other symmetric embedded algorithms can be targeted by our new techniques.