Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
DES and Differential Power Analysis (The "Duplication" Method)
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Using Second-Order Power Analysis to Attack DPA Resistant Software
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Differential Power Analysis in the Presence of Hardware Countermeasures
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Electromagnetic Analysis: Concrete Results
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Power analysis attacks and countermeasures for cryptographic algorithms
Power analysis attacks and countermeasures for cryptographic algorithms
A Logic Level Design Methodology for a Secure DPA Resistant ASIC or FPGA Implementation
Proceedings of the conference on Design, automation and test in Europe - Volume 1
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Evaluation of the Masked Logic Style MDPL on a Prototype Chip
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Two New Techniques of Side-Channel Cryptanalysis
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Multiple-Differential Side-Channel Collision Attacks on AES
CHES '08 Proceeding sof the 10th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Algebraic Methods in Side-Channel Collision Attacks and Practical Collision Detection
INDOCRYPT '08 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Cryptology in India: Progress in Cryptology
Statistical Analysis of Second Order Differential Power Analysis
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Improved side-channel collision attacks on AES
SAC'07 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Selected areas in cryptography
A generic method for secure Sbox implementation
WISA'07 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information security applications
Correlation-enhanced power analysis collision attack
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Improved collision-correlation power analysis on first order protected AES
CHES'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Thwarting higher-order side channel analysis with additive and multiplicative maskings
CHES'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Beyond the Limits of DPA: Combined Side-Channel Collision Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Unified and optimized linear collision attacks and their application in a non-profiled setting
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Hi-index | 0.00 |
In this paper we study the collision-correlation attack published by Clavier etal. at CHES 2011 on a 1st-order Boolean masking scheme and show its lack of robustness against unknown and high level of measurement noise. In order to improve the attack, we follow the approach that Gérard and Standaert proposed in a recent paper at CHES 2012. Then we address the problem of heterogeneous leakage pointed out by Gérard and Standaert (when the leakage noise is different from one Sbox output to the others due for instance to implementation particularities or resynchronisation reasons), by inserting an efficient termination algorithm in the key-recovery phase of the attack. In a last contribution, we compare (over simulations and real experiments) the enhanced collision-correlation attack and the 2nd-order CPA attack. Similarly to the results of Gérard and Standaert, we show - in the context of masked implementations - the superiority of 2nd-order CPA when its leakage model is not too far from the real leakage function.