Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
DES and Differential Power Analysis (The "Duplication" Method)
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
An Implementation of DES and AES, Secure against Some Attacks
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Investigations of power analysis attacks on smartcards
WOST'99 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology on USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology
An overview of side channel analysis attacks
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Gaussian Mixture Models for Higher-Order Side Channel Analysis
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Side Channel Cryptanalysis of a Higher Order Masking Scheme
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Information Security Applications
Unknown Plaintext Template Attacks
Information Security Applications
Threshold implementations against side-channel attacks and glitches
ICICS'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Template attacks on masking—resistance is futile
CT-RSA'07 Proceedings of the 7th Cryptographers' track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
Revisiting higher-order DPA attacks: multivariate mutual information analysis
CT-RSA'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
Exploiting the difference of side-channel leakages
COSADE'12 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
Analyzing side channel leakage of masked implementations with stochastic methods
ESORICS'07 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Research in Computer Security
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
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We introduce two new attacks: the single-bit template attack and the template-enhanced DPA attack. The single-bit template attack can be used very effectively to classify even single bits in a single side channel sample with a high probability of correctness. The template-enhanced DPA attack, combines traditional DPA with single-bit template attacks to show that if an adversary has access to a test card with even a slightly biased RNG, then he/she can break protected cryptographic implementations on a target card even if they have perfect RNGs. In support of our claim, we report results from experiments on breaking two implementations of DES and AES protected by the masking countermeasure running on smartcards of different manufacturers. In light of these results, the threat of template attacks, generally viewed as intrinsically difficult to mount, needs to be reconsidered.