Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
IPA: A New Class of Power Attacks
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Electromagnetic Analysis: Concrete Results
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
A First-Order DPA Attack Against AES in Counter Mode with Unknown Initial Counter
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '08 Proceeding sof the 10th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Blind differential cryptanalysis for enhanced power attacks
SAC'06 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Selected areas in cryptography
Template attacks in principal subspaces
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
WISA'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information Security Applications
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Template attacks on masking—resistance is futile
CT-RSA'07 Proceedings of the 7th Cryptographers' track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
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In this paper we present a variation of the template attack classification process that can be applied to block ciphers when the plaintext and ciphertext used are unknown. In a naïve implementation this attack can be applied to any round of a block cipher. We also show that when a block cipher is implemented with the masking countermeasure a similar attack can be applied to the first round of the cipher. We demonstrate that the attack works in practice by applying it to implementations of AES on 8051 and ARM7 microprocessors. We also demonstrate that the attack can be applied to implementations of block ciphers that use the masking countermeasure when three points are selected from which templates are constructed, or two points if the plaintext can be guessed.