Introduction to statistical pattern recognition (2nd ed.)
Introduction to statistical pattern recognition (2nd ed.)
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
WISA'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information Security Applications
Gaussian Mixture Models for Higher-Order Side Channel Analysis
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Information Theoretic Evaluation of Side-Channel Resistant Logic Styles
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Multiple-Differential Side-Channel Collision Attacks on AES
CHES '08 Proceeding sof the 10th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '08 Proceeding sof the 10th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
ACM Transactions on Reconfigurable Technology and Systems (TRETS)
Information Security Applications
A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks
EUROCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Unknown Plaintext Template Attacks
Information Security Applications
WISA'10 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Information security applications
A first step towards automatic application of power analysis countermeasures
Proceedings of the 48th Design Automation Conference
Characterization of the electromagnetic side channel in frequency domain
Inscrypt'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information security and cryptology
First principal components analysis: a new side channel distinguisher
ICISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Practical improvements of profiled side-channel attacks on a hardware crypto-accelerator
AFRICACRYPT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Cryptology in Africa
A new difference method for side-channel analysis with high-dimensional leakage models
CT-RSA'12 Proceedings of the 12th conference on Topics in Cryptology
CT-RSA'12 Proceedings of the 12th conference on Topics in Cryptology
COSADE'12 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
ACNS'12 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
ECML PKDD'12 Proceedings of the 2012 European conference on Machine Learning and Knowledge Discovery in Databases - Volume Part I
Efficient template attacks based on probabilistic multi-class support vector machines
CARDIS'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
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Side-channel attacks are a serious threat to implementations of cryptographic algorithms. Secret information is recovered based on power consumption, electromagnetic emanations or any other form of physical information leakage. Template attacks are probabilistic side-channel attacks, which assume a Gaussian noise model. Using the maximum likelihood principle enables us to reveal (part of) the secret for each set of recordings (i.e., leakage trace). In practice, however, the major concerns are (i) how to select the points of interest of the traces, (ii) how to choose the minimal distance between these points, and (iii) how many points of interest are needed for attacking. So far, only heuristics were provided. In this work, we propose to perform template attacks in the principal subspace of the traces. This new type of attack addresses all practical issues in principled way and automatically. The approach is validated by attacking stream ciphers such as RC4. We also report analysis results of template style attacks against an FPGA implementation of AES Rijndael. Roughly, the template attack we carried out requires five time less encrypted messages than the best reported correlation attack against similar block cipher implementations.