Resistance against Differential Power Analysis for Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
The Insecurity of the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm with Partially Known Nonces
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Template attacks in principal subspaces
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
WISA'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information Security Applications
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
EM analysis of rijndael and ECC on a wireless java-based PDA
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
ASIACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
An updated survey on secure ECC implementations: attacks, countermeasures and cost
Cryptography and Security
Localized electromagnetic analysis of cryptographic implementations
CT-RSA'12 Proceedings of the 12th conference on Topics in Cryptology
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Template attacks have been considered exclusively in the context of implementations of symmetric cryptographic algorithms on 8-bit devices. Within these scenarios, they have proven to be the most powerful attacks. In this article we investigate how template attacks can be applied to implementations of an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm on a 32-bit platform. The asymmetric cryptosystem under scrutiny is the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA). ECDSA is particularly suitable for 32-bit platforms. In this article we show that even SPA resistant implementations of ECDSA on a typical 32-bit platform succumb to template-based SPA attacks. The only way to secure such implementations against template-based SPA attacks is to make them resistant against DPA attacks.