Electromagnetic radiation from video display units: an eavesdropping risk?
Computers and Security
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Power and EM Attacks on Passive $13.56\,\textrm{MHz}$ RFID Devices
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '08 Proceeding sof the 10th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '08 Proceeding sof the 10th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Information leakage via electromagnetic emanations and evaluation of tempest countermeasures
ICISS'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Information systems security
Compromising electromagnetic emanations of wired and wireless keyboards
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Template attacks in principal subspaces
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A proposition for correlation power analysis enhancement
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
EM analysis of rijndael and ECC on a wireless java-based PDA
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Security limits for compromising emanations
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Security evaluation against electromagnetic analysis at design time
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
SCA with magnitude squared coherence
CARDIS'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
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In this article, we propose a new approach to characterize the EM leakage of electronic devices by identifying and focusing on the signals' frequencies leaking the most information. We introduce a set of tests based on cryptanalysis methods that will help vendors and users of sensitive devices to estimate the security risks due to leakage through electromagnetic emanations. We propose two approaches: an empirical one and another based on information theory. Both provide a characterization of the leakage i.e. the frequencies and the bandwidths where information is contained. These techniques are low cost, automatic, and fast as they can be performed with an oscilloscope and some softwares for the characterization. Such evaluation could also be carried out with TEMPEST. But TEMPEST evaluations require dedicated apparatus and time consuming step work that consists in scanning all the spectrum frequencies. Our approach does not substitute to regulatory TEMPEST evaluation, but nonetheless can identify the leakage with high confidence. To illustrate the relevance of our approach, we show that an online software filtering at some identified frequencies allows us to recover a key stroked in one measurement at the distance of 5 meters from the keyboard.