A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA): Measures and Counter-Measures for Smart Cards
E-SMART '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on Research in Smart Cards: Smart Card Programming and Security
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Electromagnetic Analysis: Concrete Results
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Design and Implementation of Low-Area and Low-Power AES Encryption Hardware Core
DSD '06 Proceedings of the 9th EUROMICRO Conference on Digital System Design
Security analysis of a cryptographically-enabled RFID device
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Public-Key Cryptography for RFID-Tags
PERCOMW '07 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
Energy comparison of AES and SHA-1 for ubiquitous computing
EUC'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Emerging Directions in Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing
RFID and Its Vulnerability to Faults
CHES '08 Proceeding sof the 10th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CT-RSA '09 Proceedings of the The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2009 on Topics in Cryptology
Attacking ECDSA-Enabled RFID Devices
ACNS '09 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
EM Side-Channel Attacks on Commercial Contactless Smartcards Using Low-Cost Equipment
Information Security Applications
On Comparing Side-Channel Preprocessing Techniques for Attacking RFID Devices
Information Security Applications
A survey on RFID security and provably secure grouping-proof protocols
International Journal of Internet Technology and Secured Transactions
Characterization of the electromagnetic side channel in frequency domain
Inscrypt'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Breaking mifare DESFire MF3ICD40: power analysis and templates in the real world
CHES'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Enhance multi-bit spectral analysis on hiding in temporal dimension
CARDIS'10 Proceedings of the 9th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Application
Side-Channel leakage across borders
CARDIS'10 Proceedings of the 9th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Application
Side-channel analysis of cryptographic RFIDs with analog demodulation
RFIDSec'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on RFID Security and Privacy
Attacking an AES-Enabled NFC tag: implications from design to a real-world scenario
COSADE'12 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
Applying remote side-channel analysis attacks on a security-enabled NFC tag
CT-RSA'13 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Topics in Cryptology
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During the last years, more and more security applications have been developed that are based on passive 13.56 MHz RFID devices. Among the most prominent applications are electronic passports and contactless payment systems. This article discusses the effectiveness of power and EM attacks on this kind of devices. It provides an overview of different measurement setups and it presents concrete results of power and EM attacks on two RFID prototype devices. The first device performs AES encryptions in software, while the second one performs AES encryptions in hardware. Both devices have been successfully attacked with less than 1 000 EM traces. These results emphasize the need to include countermeasures into RFID devices.