CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
NTRU: A Ring-Based Public Key Cryptosystem
ANTS-III Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Algorithmic Number Theory
Electromagnetic Analysis: Concrete Results
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Design and Implementation of Low-Area and Low-Power AES Encryption Hardware Core
DSD '06 Proceedings of the 9th EUROMICRO Conference on Digital System Design
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Security analysis of a cryptographically-enabled RFID device
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Public-Key Cryptography for RFID-Tags
PERCOMW '07 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
Remote Password Extraction from RFID Tags
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Power and EM Attacks on Passive $13.56\,\textrm{MHz}$ RFID Devices
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
On the Power of Power Analysis in the Real World: A Complete Break of the KeeLoq Code Hopping Scheme
CRYPTO 2008 Proceedings of the 28th Annual conference on Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
Attacking ECDSA-Enabled RFID Devices
ACNS '09 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Practical Algebraic Attacks on the Hitag2 Stream Cipher
ISC '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Information Security
ECC Is Ready for RFID --- A Proof in Silicon
Selected Areas in Cryptography
EM Side-Channel Attacks on Commercial Contactless Smartcards Using Low-Cost Equipment
Information Security Applications
Pushing the limits: a very compact and a threshold implementation of AES
EUROCRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 30th Annual international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques: advances in cryptology
A cryptographic processor for low-resource devices: canning ECDSA and AES like sardines
WISTP'11 Proceedings of the 5th IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practice: security and privacy of mobile devices in wireless communication
Breaking mifare DESFire MF3ICD40: power analysis and templates in the real world
CHES'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Hardware Implementation of a Flexible Tag Platform for Passive RFID Devices
DSD '11 Proceedings of the 2011 14th Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design
RFID-Tags for anti-counterfeiting
CT-RSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
Applying remote side-channel analysis attacks on a security-enabled NFC tag
CT-RSA'13 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Topics in Cryptology
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Radio-frequency identification (RFID) technology is the enabler for applications like the future internet of things (IoT), where security plays an important role. When integrating security to RFID tags, not only the cryptographic algorithms need to be secure but also their implementation. In this work we present differential power analysis (DPA) and differential electromagnetic analysis (DEMA) attacks on a security-enabled RFID tag. The attacks are conducted on both an ASIC-chip version and on an FPGA-prototype version of the tag. The design of the ASIC version equals that of commercial RFID tags and has analog and digital part integrated on a single chip. Target of the attacks is an implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with 128-bit key length and DPA countermeasures. The countermeasures are shuffling of operations and insertion of dummy rounds. Our results illustrate that the effort for successfully attacking the ASIC chip in a real-world scenario is only 4.5 times higher than for the FPGA prototype in a laboratory environment. This let us come to the conclusion that the effort for attacking contactless devices like RFID tags is only slightly higher than that for contact-based devices. The results further underline that the design of countermeasures like the insertion of dummy rounds has to be done with great care, since the detection of patterns in power or electromagnetic traces can be used to significantly lower the attacking effort.