The scientist and engineer's guide to digital signal processing
The scientist and engineer's guide to digital signal processing
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Remote Password Extraction from RFID Tags
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Power and EM Attacks on Passive $13.56\,\textrm{MHz}$ RFID Devices
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Reverse-engineering a cryptographic RFID tag
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
CT-RSA '09 Proceedings of the The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2009 on Topics in Cryptology
EM Side-Channel Attacks on Commercial Contactless Smartcards Using Low-Cost Equipment
Information Security Applications
An embedded system for practical security analysis of contactless smartcards
WISTP'07 Proceedings of the 1st IFIP TC6 /WG8.8 /WG11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practices: smart cards, mobile and ubiquitous computing systems
Improving differential power analysis by elastic alignment
CT-RSA'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Topics in cryptology: CT-RSA 2011
A versatile framework for implementation attacks on cryptographic RFIDs and embedded devices
Transactions on computational science X
Chameleon: a versatile emulator for contactless smartcards
ICISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Breaking mifare DESFire MF3ICD40: power analysis and templates in the real world
CHES'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
PUF-Based RFID authentication protocol against secret key leakage
APWeb'12 Proceedings of the 14th Asia-Pacific international conference on Web Technologies and Applications
Secure password-based remote user authentication scheme with non-tamper resistant smart cards
DBSec'12 Proceedings of the 26th Annual IFIP WG 11.3 conference on Data and Applications Security and Privacy
Side channel analysis attacks using AM demodulation on commercial smart cards with SEED
Journal of Systems and Software
Comments on an advanced dynamic ID-Based authentication scheme for cloud computing
WISM'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Web Information Systems and Mining
NSS'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Network and System Security
Improving side-channel analysis with optimal linear transforms
CARDIS'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
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As most modern cryptographic Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) devices are based on ciphers that are secure from a purely theoretical point of view, e.g., (Triple-)DES or AES, adversaries have been adopting new methods to extract secret information and cryptographic keys from contactless smartcards: Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) targets the physical implementation of a cipher and allows to recover secret keys by exploiting a side-channel, for instance, the electro-magnetic (EM) emanation of an Integrated Circuit (IC). In this paper we present an analog demodulator specifically designed for refining the SCA of contactless smartcards. The customized analogue hardware increases the quality of EM measurements, facilitates the processing of the side-channel leakage and can serve as a plug-in component to enhance any existing SCA laboratory. Employing it to obtain power profiles of several real-world cryptographic RFIDs, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our measurement setup and evaluate the improvement of our new analog technique compared to previously proposed approaches. Using the example of the popular Mifare DESFire MF3ICD40 contactless smartcard, we show that commercial RFID devices are susceptible to the proposed SCA methods. The security analyses presented in this paper do not require expensive equipment and demonstrate that SCA poses a severe threat to many real-world systems. This novel attack vector has to be taken into account when employing contactless smartcards in security-sensitive applications, e.g., for wireless payment or identification.