PUF-Based RFID authentication protocol against secret key leakage

  • Authors:
  • Yongming Jin;Wei Xin;Huiping Sun;Zhong Chen

  • Affiliations:
  • School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science, Peking University, Beijing, China and Key Laboratory of High Confidence Software Technologies, Ministry of Education, Beijing, China;School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science, Peking University, Beijing, China and Key Laboratory of High Confidence Software Technologies, Ministry of Education, Beijing, China;School of Software and Microelectronics, Peking University, Beijing, China;School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science, Peking University, Beijing, China and Key Laboratory of High Confidence Software Technologies, Ministry of Education, Beijing, China

  • Venue:
  • APWeb'12 Proceedings of the 14th Asia-Pacific international conference on Web Technologies and Applications
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

RFID tags are now pervasive in our everyday life. They raise a lot of security and privacy issues. Many authentication protocols against these problems assume that the tags can contain a secret key that is unknown to the adversary. However, physical attacks can lead to key exposure and full security breaks. On the other hand, many protocols are only described and analyzed. However, we cannot explain why they are designed like that. Compare with the previous protocols, we first propose a universal RFID authentication protocol and show the principle why the protocol is designed. It can be instantiated for various types and achieve different security properties according to the implementation of the functions. Then we introduce a general prototype of delay-based PUF for low-cost RFID systems and propose a new lightweight RFID authentication protocol based on the general prototype of PUF. The new protocol not only resists the physical attacks and secret key leakage, but also prevents the asynchronization between the reader and the tag. It also can resist the replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack etc. Finally, we show that it is efficient and practical for low-cost RFID systems.