Electromagnetic radiation from video display units: an eavesdropping risk?
Computers and Security
The threat of information theft by reception of electromagnetic radiation from RS-232 cables
Computers and Security
Information leakage from optical emanations
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA): Measures and Counter-Measures for Smart Cards
E-SMART '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on Research in Smart Cards: Smart Card Programming and Security
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Keyboard acoustic emanations revisited
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Dictionary attacks using keyboard acoustic emanations
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Timing analysis of keystrokes and timing attacks on SSH
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Computers and Electrical Engineering
Compromising Reflections-or-How to Read LCD Monitors around the Corner
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
ClearShot: Eavesdropping on Keyboard Input from Video
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Information leakage via electromagnetic emanations and evaluation of tempest countermeasures
ICISS'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Information systems security
Security limits for compromising emanations
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
TouchLogger: inferring keystrokes on touch screen from smartphone motion
HotSec'11 Proceedings of the 6th USENIX conference on Hot topics in security
Effective digital forensics research is investigator-centric
HotSec'11 Proceedings of the 6th USENIX conference on Hot topics in security
Characterization of the electromagnetic side channel in frequency domain
Inscrypt'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information security and cryptology
iSpy: automatic reconstruction of typed input from compromising reflections
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Televisions, video privacy, and powerline electromagnetic interference
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
(sp)iPhone: decoding vibrations from nearby keyboards using mobile phone accelerometers
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tapprints: your finger taps have fingerprints
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services
On the practicality of motion based keystroke inference attack
TRUST'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing
Potentia est scientia: security and privacy implications of energy-proportional computing
HotSec'12 Proceedings of the 7th USENIX conference on Hot Topics in Security
Fingerprint attack against touch-enabled devices
Proceedings of the second ACM workshop on Security and privacy in smartphones and mobile devices
Collaborative TCP sequence number inference attack: how to crack sequence number under a second
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Seeing double: reconstructing obscured typed input from repeated compromising reflections
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
ipShield: a framework for enforcing context-aware privacy
NSDI'14 Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Conference on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
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Computer keyboards are often used to transmit confidential data such as passwords. Since they contain electronic components, keyboards eventually emit electromagnetic waves. These emanations could reveal sensitive information such as keystrokes. The technique generally used to detect compromising emanations is based on a wide-band receiver, tuned on a specific frequency. However, this method may not be optimal since a significant amount of information is lost during the signal acquisition. Our approach is to acquire the raw signal directly from the antenna and to process the entire captured electromagnetic spectrum. Thanks to this method, we detected four different kinds of compromising electromagnetic emanations generated by wired and wireless keyboards. These emissions lead to a full or a partial recovery of the keystrokes. We implemented these sidechannel attacks and our best practical attack fully recovered 95% of the keystrokes of a PS/2 keyboard at a distance up to 20 meters, even through walls. We tested 12 different keyboard models bought between 2001 and 2008 (PS/2, USB, wireless and laptop). They are all vulnerable to at least one of the four attacks. We conclude that most of modern computer keyboards generate compromising emanations (mainly because of the manufacturer cost pressures in the design). Hence, they are not safe to transmit confidential information.