Electromagnetic radiation from video display units: an eavesdropping risk?
Computers and Security
The threat of information theft by reception of electromagnetic radiation from RS-232 cables
Computers and Security
Computer security basics
Security aspects of wireless local area networks
Computers and Security
Information systems security: a practitioner's reference
Information systems security: a practitioner's reference
Communication systems engineering
Communication systems engineering
IEEE Spectrum
A note on the confinement problem
Communications of the ACM
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
The Undocumented PC
Physical Level Interfaces and Protocols
Physical Level Interfaces and Protocols
PGP: Pretty Good Privacy
Optical Time-Domain Eavesdropping Risks of CRT Displays
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
TTL Cookbook
Dictionary attacks using keyboard acoustic emanations
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Evaluation of Information Leakage via Electromagnetic Emanation and Effectiveness of Tempest
IEICE - Transactions on Information and Systems
Information leakage via electromagnetic emanations and evaluation of tempest countermeasures
ICISS'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Information systems security
Compromising electromagnetic emanations of wired and wireless keyboards
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Hardware trust implications of 3-D integration
WESS '10 Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Embedded Systems Security
Acoustic side-channel attacks on printers
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
iSpy: automatic reconstruction of typed input from compromising reflections
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Televisions, video privacy, and powerline electromagnetic interference
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Evaluation and improvement of the tempest fonts
WISA'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information Security Applications
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A previously unknown form of compromising emanations has been discovered. LED status indicators on data communication equipment, under certain conditions, are shown to carry a modulated optical signal that is significantly correlated with information being processed by the device. Physical access is not required; the attacker gains access to all data going through the device, including plaintext in the case of data encryption systems. Experiments show that it is possible to intercept data under realistic conditions at a considerable distance. Many different sorts of devices, including modems and Internet Protocol routers, were found to be vulnerable. A taxonomy of compromising optical emanations is developed, and design changes are described that will successfully block this kind of "Optical Tempest" attack.