Electromagnetic radiation from video display units: an eavesdropping risk?
Computers and Security
Information leakage from optical emanations
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA): Measures and Counter-Measures for Smart Cards
E-SMART '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on Research in Smart Cards: Smart Card Programming and Security
Optical Fault Induction Attacks
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Optical Time-Domain Eavesdropping Risks of CRT Displays
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Electromagnetic eavesdropping risks of flat-panel displays
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Evaluation and improvement of the tempest fonts
WISA'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information Security Applications
Security limits for compromising emanations
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Compromising electromagnetic emanations of wired and wireless keyboards
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Characterization of the electromagnetic side channel in frequency domain
Inscrypt'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information security and cryptology
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It is well known that there is relationship between electro-magnetic emanation and processing information in IT devices such as personal computers and smart cards. By analyzing such electromagnetic emanation, eavesdropper will be able to get some information, so it becomes a real threat of information security. In this paper, we show how to estimate amount of information that is leaked as electromagnetic emanation. We assume the area between the IT device and the receiver is a communication channel, and we define the amount of information leakage via electromagnetic emanations by its channel capacity. By some experimental results of Tempest, we show example estimations of amount of information leakage. Using the value of channel capacity, we can calculate the amount of information per pixel in the reconstructed image. And we evaluate the effectiveness of Tempest fonts generated by Gaussian method and its threshold of security.