Information leakage from optical emanations
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Keyboard acoustic emanations revisited
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Opportunities and Limits of Remote Timing Attacks
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Seeing-Is-Believing: using camera phones for human-verifiable authentication
International Journal of Security and Networks
Evaluation of Information Leakage via Electromagnetic Emanation and Effectiveness of Tempest
IEICE - Transactions on Information and Systems
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Transactions on Computational Science IV
Keyboard acoustic emanations revisited
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Information leakage via electromagnetic emanations and evaluation of tempest countermeasures
ICISS'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Information systems security
ECCV'10 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Computer vision: Part VI
Acoustic side-channel attacks on printers
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
iSpy: automatic reconstruction of typed input from compromising reflections
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Televisions, video privacy, and powerline electromagnetic interference
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
(sp)iPhone: decoding vibrations from nearby keyboards using mobile phone accelerometers
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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SP'04 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Security Protocols
Electromagnetic eavesdropping risks of flat-panel displays
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
An emerging threat: eve meets a robot
INTRUST'10 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Trusted Systems
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A new eavesdropping technique can be used to read cathode-ray tube(CRT) displays at a distance. The intensity of the light emitted by araster-scan screen as a function of time corresponds to the videosignal convolved with the impulse response of the phosphors.Experiments with a typical personal computer color monitor show thatenough high-frequency content remains in the emitted light to permitthe reconstruction of readable text by deconvolving the signalreceived with a fast photosensor. These optical compromisingemanations can be received even after diffuse reflection from a wall.Shot noise from background light is the critical performance factor.In a sufficiently dark environment and with a large enough sensoraperture, practically significant reception distances are possible.This information security risk should be considered in applicationswith high confidentiality requirements, especially in those thatalready require "TEMPEST"-shielded equipment designed to minimizeradio-frequency emission-security concerns.