Keyboard acoustic emanations revisited

  • Authors:
  • Li Zhuang;Feng Zhou;J. D. Tygar

  • Affiliations:
  • University of California, Berkeley;University of California, Berkeley;University of California, Berkeley

  • Venue:
  • ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

We examine the problem of keyboard acoustic emanations. We present a novel attack taking as input a 10-minute sound recording of a user typing English text using a keyboard and recovering up to 96% of typed characters. There is no need for training recordings labeled with the corresponding clear text. A recognizer bootstrapped from a 10-minute sound recording can even recognize random text such as passwords: In our experiments, 90% of 5-character random passwords using only letters can be generated in fewer than 20 attempts by an adversary; 80% of 10-character passwords can be generated in fewer than 75 attempts by an adversary. In the attack, we use the statistical constraints of the underlying content, English language, to reconstruct text from sound recordings without knowing the corresponding clear text. The attack incorporates a combination of standard machine learning and speech recognition techniques, including cepstrum features, Hidden Markov Models, linear classification, and feedback-based incremental learning.