Timing attacks on PIN input devices

Authors:
Denis Foo Kune;Yongdae Kim
Affiliations:
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA;University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA
Venue:
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Year:
2010

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Abstract

Keypads are commonly used to enter personal identification numbers (PIN) which are intended to authenticate a user based on what they know. A number of those keypads such as ATM inputs and door keypads provide an audio feedback to the user for each button pressed. Such audio feedback are observable from a modest distance. We are looking at quantifying the information leaking from delays between acoustic feedback pulses. Preliminary experiments suggest that by using a Hidden Markov Model, it might be possible to substantially narrow the search space. A subsequent brute force search on the reduced search space could be possible with- out triggering alerts, lockouts or other mechanisms design to thwart plain brute force attempts.