Electromagnetic radiation revisited
Computers and Security
Electromagnetic radiation from video display units: an eavesdropping risk?
Computers and Security
Optical Time-Domain Eavesdropping Risks of CRT Displays
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Reducing shoulder-surfing by using gaze-based password entry
Proceedings of the 3rd symposium on Usable privacy and security
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UbiComp '08 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Ubiquitous computing
Evaluation of Information Leakage via Electromagnetic Emanation and Effectiveness of Tempest
IEICE - Transactions on Information and Systems
An index-based privacy preserving service trigger in context-aware computing environments
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
Information leakage via electromagnetic emanations and evaluation of tempest countermeasures
ICISS'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Information systems security
Acoustic side-channel attacks on printers
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
A new shoulder-surfing resistant password for mobile environments
Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Ubiquitous Information Management and Communication
Heat of the moment: characterizing the efficacy of thermal camera-based attacks
WOOT'11 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX conference on Offensive technologies
iSpy: automatic reconstruction of typed input from compromising reflections
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Televisions, video privacy, and powerline electromagnetic interference
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Evaluation and improvement of the tempest fonts
WISA'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information Security Applications
An emerging threat: eve meets a robot
INTRUST'10 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Trusted Systems
NordSec'11 Proceedings of the 16th Nordic conference on Information Security Technology for Applications
Investigating receptiveness to sensing and inference in the home using sensor proxies
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Ubiquitous Computing
Potentia est scientia: security and privacy implications of energy-proportional computing
HotSec'12 Proceedings of the 7th USENIX conference on Hot Topics in Security
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Electromagnetic eavesdropping of computer displays – first demonstrated to the general public by van Eck in 1985 – is not restricted to cathode-ray tubes. Modern flat-panel displays can be at least as vulnerable. They are equally driven by repetitive video signals in frequency ranges where even shielded cables leak detectable radio waves into the environment. Nearby eavesdroppers can pick up such compromising emanations with directional antennas and wideband receivers. Periodic averaging can lift a clearly readable image out of the background noise. The serial Gbit/s transmission formats used by modern digital video interfaces in effect modulate the signal, thereby making it even better suited for remote reception than emanations from analog systems. Understanding the exact transmission format used leads to new attacks and defenses. We can tune screen colors for optimal remote readability by eavesdroppers. We can likewise modify text-display routines to render the radio emanations unreadable.