Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The State Explosion Problem from Trace to Bisimulation Equivalence
FOSSACS '00 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures: Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software,ETAPS 2000
Receipt-Freeness in Large-Scale Elections without Untappable Channels
I3E '01 Proceedings of the IFIP Conference on Towards The E-Society: E-Commerce, E-Business, E-Government
Incoercible multiparty computation
FOCS '96 Proceedings of the 37th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Analyzing internet voting security
Communications of the ACM - Voting systems
Social Science Computer Review
Coercion-resistant electronic elections
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
SOUPS '06 Proceedings of the second symposium on Usable privacy and security
Coercion-Resistance and Receipt-Freeness in Electronic Voting
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Electronic voting systems: Requirements, design, and implementation
Computer Standards & Interfaces
Multi-designated verifiers signatures: anonymity without encryption
Information Processing Letters
Automated Verification of Remote Electronic Voting Protocols in the Applied Pi-Calculus
CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Civitas: Toward a Secure Voting System
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Point/counterpoint: The U.S. should ban paperless electronic voting machines
Communications of the ACM
Helios: web-based open-audit voting
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
CodeVoting protection against automatic vote manipulation in an uncontrolled environment
VOTE-ID'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on E-voting and identity
Electing a university president using open-audit voting: analysis of real-world use of Helios
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Electromagnetic eavesdropping risks of flat-panel displays
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting with everlasting privacy
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Coercion-resistant electronic elections
Towards Trustworthy Elections
Selections: internet voting with over-the-shoulder coercion-resistance
FC'11 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
International Journal of Information Management: The Journal for Information Professionals
On authentication factors: "what you can" and "how you do it"
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks
Blinded additively homomorphic encryption schemes for self-tallying voting
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
In this paper, we introduce the notion of mental voting booths, i.e., a building block for voting schemes that provides remote voters with similar protection as that offered by physical voting booths, essentially protecting them from over-the-shoulder coercion attacks (shoulder-surfing). We introduce a framework to model voting booths and formulate a property of the modelled booths that is sufficient to ensure over-the-shoulder coercion resistance. Next, we propose an example of mental booth that is simple enough to be used by any voter without prior training and show that an execution of the remote booth in the presence of the adversary is equivalent to that execution in his absence (e.g., inside a physical booth). The only cost lies in the use of an untappable channel in order to transmit a piece of information before the voting phase. Mental booths also allow for the voter to safely delegate his own voice to an untrusted person while still being able to verify that the untrusted person followed his instructions while voting.