The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Self-tallying Elections and Perfect Ballot Secrecy
PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography
Coercion-resistant electronic elections
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Tamper resistance: a cautionary note
WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
Preservation of Privacy in Thwarting the Ballot Stuffing Scheme
TrustBus '08 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business
Lower bounds for discrete logarithms and related problems
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Electing a university president using open-audit voting: analysis of real-world use of Helios
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
On e-vote integrity in the case of malicious voter computers
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Practical remote end-to-end voting scheme
EGOVIS'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Electronic government and the information systems perspective
Attacking and Fixing Helios: An Analysis of Ballot Secrecy
CSF '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
NordSec'11 Proceedings of the 16th Nordic conference on Information Security Technology for Applications
Towards a DL-based additively homomorphic encryption scheme
ISC'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Information Security
Boardroom voting scheme with unconditionally secret ballots based on DC-Net
NSS'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Network and System Security
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In this paper, we propose a self-tallying election protocol based public key homomorphic encryption. The additive homomorphism allows a set of participants (voters) to publish an encrypted value (ballot) and to compute the encrypted sum of all these values based on their ciphertexts. Our scheme has the particularity that anyone can decrypt the sum, but only once all participants have contributed to its computation. More precisely, the sum can be decrypted at all times, but remains blinded until all participants have contributed their vote, which contains a share of the unblinding key. Additionally, we propose an adaptation of Helios in order to provide self-tallying.