Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The random oracle methodology, revisited (preliminary version)
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Priced Oblivious Transfer: How to Sell Digital Goods
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Protocols for Set Membership and Range Proofs
ASIACRYPT '08 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Security and Trust for the Norwegian E-Voting Pilot Project E-valg 2011
NordSec '09 Proceedings of the 14th Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems: Identity and Privacy in the Internet Age
Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
First CPIR protocol with data-dependent computation
ICISC'09 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information security and cryptology
On e-vote integrity in the case of malicious voter computers
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Single-database private information retrieval with constant communication rate
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
An oblivious transfer protocol with log-squared communication
ISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security
The Twist-AUgmented technique for key exchange
PKC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory and Practice of Public-Key Cryptography
On e-vote integrity in the case of malicious voter computers
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Selections: internet voting with over-the-shoulder coercion-resistance
FC'11 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Cobra: toward concurrent ballot authorization for internet voting
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
The norwegian internet voting protocol
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
The application of i-voting for estonian parliamentary elections of 2011
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Blinded additively homomorphic encryption schemes for self-tallying voting
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks
Remotegrity: design and use of an end-to-end verifiable remote voting system
ACNS'13 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Scaling privacy guarantees in code-verification elections
Vote-ID'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Attacking the verification code mechanism in the norwegian internet voting system
Vote-ID'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on E-Voting and Identity
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Norway has started to implement e-voting (over the Internet, and by using voters' own computers) within the next few years. The vulnerability of voter's computers was identified as a serious threat to e-voting. In this paper, we study the vote integrity of e-voting when the voter computers cannot be trusted. First, we make a number of assumptions about the available infrastructure. In particular, we assume the existence of two out-of-band channels that do not depend on the voter computers. The first channel is used to transmit integrity check codes to the voters prior the election, and the second channel is used to transmit a check code, that corresponds to her vote, back to a voter just after his or her e-vote vast cast. For this we also introduce a new cryptographic protocol.We present the new protocol with enough details to facilitate an implementation, and also present the timings of an actual implementation.