Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Almost entirely correct mixing with applications to voting
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
A Verifiable Secret Shuffle of Homomorphic Encryptions
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
A robust and verifiable cryptographically secure election scheme
SFCS '85 Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
ISPEC '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
Oracle-Assisted Static Diffie-Hellman Is Easier Than Discrete Logarithms
Cryptography and Coding '09 Proceedings of the 12th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding
Multi-authority secret-ballot elections with linear work
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme: a practical solution to the implementation of a voting booth
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Verifiable internet voting solving secure platform problem
IWSEC'07 Proceedings of the Security 2nd international conference on Advances in information and computer security
A latency-free election scheme
CT-RSA'08 Proceedings of the 2008 The Cryptopgraphers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in cryptology
On e-vote integrity in the case of malicious voter computers
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Unclonable group identification
EUROCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Using mobile device communication to strengthen e-Voting protocols
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
Scaling privacy guarantees in code-verification elections
Vote-ID'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on E-Voting and Identity
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
The Norwegian government will run a trial of internet remote voting during the 2011 local government elections. A new cryptographic voting protocol will be used, where so-called return codes allow voters to verify that their ballots will be counted as cast. This paper discusses a slightly simplified version of the cryptographic protocol. The description and analysis of the simplified protocol contains most of the ideas and concepts used to build and analyse the full protocol. In particular, the simplified protocol uses the full protocol's novel method for generating the return codes. The security of the protocol relies on a novel hardness assumption similar to Decision Diffie-Hellman. While DDH is a claim that a random subgroup of a non-cyclic group is indistinguishable from the whole group, our assumption is related to the indistinguishability of certain special subgroups. We discuss this question in some detail.