The Business of Electronic Voting
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Coercion-resistant electronic elections
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Automated Verification of Remote Electronic Voting Protocols in the Applied Pi-Calculus
CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Civitas: Toward a Secure Voting System
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Helios: web-based open-audit voting
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Electing a university president using open-audit voting: analysis of real-world use of Helios
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Vote-independence: a powerful privacy notion for voting protocols
FPS'11 Proceedings of the 4th Canada-France MITACS conference on Foundations and Practice of Security
The norwegian internet voting protocol
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
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Remote e-voting protocols strive to achieve sophisticated security properties. However, the inherent complexity of this level of sophistication typically comes at a cost: Protocols must either accept trade-offs in terms of security or are impractical. In this paper, we show how the additional communication capabilities given by the pervasive availability of mobile phones today can be used to strengthen the security offered by remote e-voting protocols. More precisely, the presence of two separate channels between the voter and the election authorities, namely the possibility for voters to communicate with authorities using both their computers and their mobile phones, opens up useful possibilities to significantly improve the security of remote e-voting with little cost in practicality. We discuss three mobile building blocks that can be plugged into many existing protocols from the literature, and that yield important security properties such as eligibility, resistance against impersonation attacks, inalterability, vote independence and coercion resistance, and even privacy and integrity of votes in the presence of malicious computers, under realistic assumptions.