Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A formal framework for quantifying voter-controlled privacy
Journal of Algorithms
Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Computing Knowledge in Security Protocols under Convergent Equational Theories
CADE-22 Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Automated Deduction
Formal Analysis of the Estonian Mobile-ID Protocol
NordSec '09 Proceedings of the 14th Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems: Identity and Privacy in the Internet Age
Verifying Anonymous Credential Systems in Applied Pi Calculus
CANS '09 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security
Election verifiability in electronic voting protocols
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Towards automatic analysis of election verifiability properties
ARSPA-WITS'10 Proceedings of the 2010 joint conference on Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis and issues in the theory of security
Analysis of a receipt-free auction protocol in the applied pi calculus
FAST'10 Proceedings of the 7th International conference on Formal aspects of security and trust
Procedural security analysis: A methodological approach
Journal of Systems and Software
Formal analysis of an electronic voting system: An experience report
Journal of Systems and Software
Anonymity, Privacy, Onymity, and Identity: A Modal Logic Approach
Transactions on Data Privacy
Adapting helios for provable ballot privacy
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
Computing Knowledge in Security Protocols Under Convergent Equational Theories
Journal of Automated Reasoning
SeVe: automatic tool for verification of security protocols
Frontiers of Computer Science in China
Automated verification of equivalence properties of cryptographic protocols
ESOP'12 Proceedings of the 21st European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
Security protocol verification: symbolic and computational models
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
NordSec'11 Proceedings of the 16th Nordic conference on Information Security Technology for Applications
Challenges in ehealth: from enabling to enforcing privacy
FHIES'11 Proceedings of the First international conference on Foundations of Health Informatics Engineering and Systems
Formal analysis of privacy for routing protocols in mobile ad hoc networks
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Formal verification of e-auction protocols
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Using mobile device communication to strengthen e-Voting protocols
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
Vote-ID'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on E-Voting and Identity
A game-based definition of coercion resistance and its applications
Journal of Computer Security - CSF 2010
Journal of Computer Security - Foundational Aspects of Security
Attacking and fixing Helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy
Journal of Computer Security
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We present a general technique for modeling remote electronic voting protocols in the applied pi-calculus and for automatically verifying their security. In the first part of this paper, we provide novel definitions that address several important security properties. In particular, we propose a new formalization of coercion-resistance in terms of observational equivalence. In contrast to previous definitions in the symbolic model, our definition of coercion-resistance is suitable for automation and captures simulation and forced-abstention attacks. Additionally, we express inalterability, eligibility, and non-reusability as a correspondence property on traces. In the second part, we use ProVerif to illustrate the feasibility of our technique by providing the first automated security proof of the coercion-resistant protocol proposed by Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson.