Formal Analysis of the Estonian Mobile-ID Protocol

  • Authors:
  • Peeter Laud;Meelis Roos

  • Affiliations:
  • Cybernetica AS, and Institute of Computer Science, Tartu University,;Cybernetica AS, and Institute of Computer Science, Tartu University,

  • Venue:
  • NordSec '09 Proceedings of the 14th Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems: Identity and Privacy in the Internet Age
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

In this paper, we report the results of the formal analysis performed on the Estonian Mobile-ID protocol (deployed since 2008), allowing citizens and permanent residents of Estonia to authenticate themselves and issue digital signatures with the help of a signature-capable SIM-card inside their mobile phone. We analyze the resiliency of the protocol to network attacks under various threat models (compromised infrastructure, client application, etc., confusing user interface) and give suggestions for improvement.